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SS - Histoire du service secret nazi / André Brissaud

En réponse à -19 -18 -17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2
-1Actualisation de françois delpla

J'ai un problème de date de Etienne Lorenceau le lundi 07 novembre 2011 à 12h32

Comme vous le savez, walter schellenberg, après l'assassinat de Heydrich, a été récupéré par Himmler qui le fait rentrer dans son network. Or les dates sur le rapport final d'interrogatoire de schellenberg sur la réunion Hoare et hohenlohe démontre que les nazis savent parfaitement que Hoare est un émmissaire personnel de Churchill et non de Anthony Eden. Selon moi, le FO est bien tenu à l'écart et c'est par Churchill qu'Eden est prévenu des discussion de Hoare
Ce n'est pas négligeable car le gouvernement Britannique n'a pas sur la politique juive des nazis une attitude unanime. Anthony Eden est pour une politique pro arabe (langue qu'il parle couramment) alors que Churchill qui a participé à la Balfour est révolté par les massacres des juifs, les dénonce et souhaite les combattre. Or en mai 1942, les nazis sont en pleine réalisation de l'opération Reinhardt.

July 1942: Reportedly WS conceived the idea of establishing contact with Sir Samuel Hoare special British ambassador in Spain to attempt preliminary peace feeler. He had come in contact with Lindemann, President of the Nord Deutsche Lloyd, Deputy Head of the International Chamber of Commerce and head of one of the largest and oldest established firms trading with the Far East.

Lindemann was well known in Switzerland and had there a valuable contact, a certain Fritz Klein, a German refugee from 1936. He was also a friend of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek, and of Foster Dulles. In Schellenberg’s eyes he was an eligible intermediary for both the British and the Americans. So he organized for Lindemann to meet with Max von Hohenlohe to try and secure an interview with Sir Samuel Hoare.After due consideration they decided that the present situation was not offering an opportunity and decided to wait.
Harrisson G. W. Final report on WS. p. 29

WS claims he would discuss with Lindemann in 1943 Hitler’s liquidation but we don’t have the date nor the details.
Harrisson G. W. Final report on WS. p. 74

This report means that WS was conscious, that, after Venlo, he could no longer be a valid personal intermediary for the British? Then what do his negotiations to follow meant? Was he trying to play on Spain the variant of an incident of the kind, which had worked so well in Poland and Holland? Did Jahnke make him a Russian spy to check on the allies that they would not make a separate peace with Germany, or on the contrary was he trying to cut Roosevelt/Hopkins American armament supply to the Russians? What was the real intent between his well-known and less known negotiations? Could he be Werther blackmailing one or several of the secretaries at Hitler’s strategy table?

Mid July 1942: Negotiations opened by WS and General Kousi, Chiang Kai Shek envoy, for a German mediation for peace between China and Japan. WS reports to Himmler who arranges for him to speak with Ribbentrop. Negotiation lasted three months without success as the Chinese decided apparently to negotiate through Russians.

July 17, 1942: Himmler visits Auschwitz-Birkenau and gives Rudolf Höss (Hoess), the camp commandant, his approval for an ambitious expansion plan: the main camp, the Birkenau extension and the building of the gigantic « I.G. Farben » synthetic rubber factory at Manovic There is now about 30'000 inmates, mostly Jewish and Polish political prisonners. Himmler watches the gassing of a group of Jewish people in one of the gaz chambers. Crews begin building a complex of four state-of-the-art killing centers. Each is a brick crematorium containing under one roof all the necessary facilities for the complete process, from undressing through gassing to cremation in specially designed furnaces. Himmler is so satisfied that he promotes Rudolf Höss to lieutenant-colonel.
A transport of Dutch Jews arrives at Auschwitz, and Himmler witnesses the execution of 449 persons in Bunker 2, his first such experience.
That evening, Himmler attends a dinner party at Gauleiter Fritz Bracht's luxurious villa in a forest near Kattowitz. The villa had in fact been loaned to Bracht by Giesche, one of Germany's leading mining firms, whose chief executive officer and general manager was Eduard Schulte. The villa had originally been built for the use of Giesche's American directors. (As a result of a complex financing scheme in the 1920's Giesche's Polish operations were under American management by The Silesian-American Corporation) (See Harriman, Bush and others).

July 18-20 1942: WS is in Lublin where he meets with Himmler who just visited Auschwitz: not long after Himmler will issue, on May 20th an order concerning the Jewish population of the protectorate of Bohemia Moravia.

July 27, 1942: a German lieutenant colonel, Artur Sommer, an economist and Deputy Director of the ‘Allied and Neutral States’ Group in the Economy Office of the Armed Forces High Command, travels to Switzerland on official business. Sommer had been in Switzerland before and had visited another economist, Professor Edgar Salin, at the University of Basel. On those occasions Sommer had freely talked about German behavior in the USSR, once leaving packets of photographs showing emaciated and dead Soviet prisoners of war. This time Salin found a note without an envelope in his box. It stated: In the East camps are being prepared in which all the Jews of Europe and a large part of the Soviet prisoners of war are to be gassed. Please send messages immediately to Roosevelt and Churchill. If the BBC will warn daily against the gas ovens, their use may be prevented, since the criminals will do everything to make sure that the German people will not find out what they are planning and what they can surely carry out as well.
The information in Sommer's note was already comparatively old. Gas had already been considered for the Russians and Jews in 1941. The program was to be implemented in the Baltic area and Byelorussia, partly in camps prepared for roundups of Communists, but it was subsequently shifted to Poland, where it was in full swing by summer 1942. Evidently Sommer had learned of the early plans several months late. His suggestion that the British Broadcasting Corporation paralyze the perpetrators psychologically was not altogether new either. The BBC had already made some broadcasts, albeit not the plenary, forceful daily announcements that he had in mind. Sommer's message has considerable significance, because it was sent by someone in Berlin who was close to the truth, and second because it was an unambiguous statement to the effect that Jews were to be gassed.
Eduard Schulte, who was an industrialist in Breslau, where he headed a large mining concern, Bergwerksgesellschaft Georg von Giesche's Erben. His connections in Germany included a German colonel and a Giesche manager who was close to Gauleiter Karl Hanke of Lower Silesia. Like Sommer, Schulte had previously been in Switzerland on business and had given information to various people about German policies and plans. This time, his visit was prompted by something he had heard about the Jews: they were going to be annihilated. On July 30, 1942, he talked to a business associate, Isidor Koppelmann, who contacted the press officer of the Swiss Jewish community, Benjamin Sagalowitz. Schulte wanted his message to be transmitted to America and Britain, and Sagalowitz turned to Riegner in Geneva. Riegner consulted Professor Guggenheim. The choices are few. One could not simply fly to London or New York and deliver the message personally. Communication through the mail or telegrams risked Swiss censorship. An approach to Allied representatives in Switzerland, however, offered the possibility of speed and security, as well as help in gathering additional information. On the morning of August 8, Riegner set out to meet with the British and American consuls in Geneva. Riegner, who had not met Schulte and had not been given his name, drafted a notice containing the substance of Schulte's statement. It was addressed to Sydney Silverman, of the World Jewish Congree in London and of the Parliament, and to Rabbi Wise in New York. By the end of July 1942, gassings were already under way in Kulmhof, Auschwitz, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Maydanek (Lublin). Only Treblinka had just begun its operations. The message, however, contained not only the overwhelming truth of annihilation, but some telling details. Thus there was stockpiling of deportees from Germany and Slovakia in a number of eastern ghettos, pending organized shootings or gassings, and prussic acid, the active ingredient in Zyklon B, was the gas already introduced in Auschwitz, the death camp in Upper Silesia, next door to Lower Silesia.
When Vice Consul Howard Elting met with Riegner in the American consulate, he felt it his duty to request that the Allied governments and Rabbi Wise be informed and “try by every means to obtain confirmation or denial.”

For Riegner the pieces were already falling into place. They were not so convincing to the Allied governments. The Department of State decided that, pending corroboration of the information, the message should not be delivered to Rabbi Wise. In the British Foreign office, the telegram was considered for seven days before it was passed on to Sydney Silverman. Wise received the message from Silverman on August 24. The head of United States Treasury Morgenthau was so infuriated by this administrative procrastination that it became a major reason for obtaining the creation of the War Refugee Board.

Or en mars 1942, les nazis sont en pleine implementation de l'opération Reinhardt. Tous les services de Himmler sont mobilisés sur les premières mises en oeuvre à grande échelle de la Shoah, avec l'ouverture de Belzec.

March 1, 1942: Canaris and Heydrich meet for lunch at the Wannsee Institute, and sign an agreement headed “Implementation directives relating to official dealings between military Abwehr agencies and agencies of the Security Police and SD”. The text had been negotiated by WS and Huppenkothen with Bentivegni ferociously defending the Abwehr’s position. With this agreement, the RSHA took over all of the counter-espionage and the control of the Geheime Feldgendarmerrie which was incorporated in the Gestapo. The negotiation, started in December 1941, had been rough and Himmler had had to intervene before Keitel would agree to it and ask Heydrich to accept meeting with Canaris. They also approved the principles laid out in another document entitled “Principles governing co-operation between the Security Police and SD and the Abwehr agencies of the Wehrmacht.” which text had to be properly written later.

March early, 1942: WS travels to Spain with Admiral Canaris

May 1942: The Allies receive the first authoritative and exact report of the German annihilation of Jews in Poland. More than 700,000 have already been murdered. This information has been smuggled out of Poland by the underground Jewish Socialist Party.

During a visit to Sweden, Pastor Dietrich Bonhöffer (Bonhoeffer) takes with him peace proposals from a group of German conspirators led by General Hans Oster, Chief of Staff of the Abwehr, and General Ludwig Beck, but they are rejected by the British Foreign Office.

Au même moment (début mai) Sobibor est mis en opération et le massacre dans les chambres à gaz démarre à Auschwitz et Birkenau et le couple heydrich schellenberg qui a peu de contacts directs avec hitler se concentre sur l'extension de leur pouvoir au détriment de l'Abwehr

May 18 1942: Canaris had traveled with his wife to Prague and was staying at the Heydrich’s home. At 10:30 Heydrich and Canaris are chairing a secret conference at the Prague’s Hradschin Palace for the cooperation between the Abwehr, the RSHA. SS Gruppenfuehrer H. Müller, SS Obersturmbahnfuehrer WS and SS Gruppenfuehrer Nebe are on the podium. The conference gathers the heads of the Abwehr “Stellen” and of the heads of sections of the RSHA. The invitations were marked “secret” requested punctuality owing to the main host rank. After a neutral opening speech by Heydrich and then an expose by Canaris on the project for tightening of the links between the Abwehr the Gestapo and the SD, Müller started criticizing violently in his speech the obsolete and bureaucratic working methods of the Abwehr, its poor training and its dubious political trustworthiness. Concluding the meeting Heydrich imposed the final text of the “Principles governing co-operation between the Security Police and SD and the Abwehr agencies of the Wehrmacht.” Agreed upon on March 1, which would become known as the “ten commandments of the Prague’s god”. The point 5 was stating that the function of counter espionage is to investigate and neutralize all foreign intelligence service operating against the interest of the Reich. The function of the military Abwehr service in this respect is to combat the [foreign] secret intelligence service and the activity of foreign intelligence service directly related thereto. Given that foreign intelligence services also engage in political acts of subversion, sabotage and terrorism, counter-espionage shall in future be an additional functionof the Security Police and SD.”

Il me semble que votre analyse ne saurait ignorer le contexte
hitler, qui se voit comme un stratège génial, est en pleine préparation de sa stratégie offensive à l'Est
himmler, heydrich, schellenberg se sont occupé de lancer la shoah et préparent son extension à l'est
les discussions sur la question juive avec Hoare ne sont donc pas secondaires et constituent donc, selon moi, l'introduction de la continuation du bluff de Venlo mais avec un schellenberg qui a trouvé une autre monnaie d'échange que la tête d'hitler: celle des juifs dont les nazis croient qu'ils contrôlent secrètement la politique à l'ouest.

*** / ***

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