Il me semble qu'il faut suivre la chronologie avant d'avancer une analyse des faits et non partir d'une theorie emotionelle et y chercher des preuves:
March 1, 1943: The relationship has deteriorated between Switzerland and Germany due to the concern on the German side that Switzerland, in certain circumstances, could be forced to abandon her neutrality and join the Western Powers. WS claims he knew from Himmler’s hints that party circles in Germany, supported by a part of the Foreign Office and of the Wehrmacht, were lobbying Hitler for a preventive invasion of Switzerland.

WS sends Hans Eggen to warn Masson who was already aware of the threat from other sources.
Source: Nara: Harrisson G. W. Final report on WS p 45

March 3, 1943: Colonel Masson together with General Guisan, the Commander in Chief of the Swiss army anxiously drive to the village of Biglen in Switzerland to meet with WS. They tell him that they understand there would be plans for a German attack on Switzerland during March 1943. The two Swiss were nervous. In January of that year the Viking Line, the Swiss spy network enjoying the support of some Canaris’s officers, had warned of the existence of such a plan to invade Switzerland.
Source: Bauer, Yehuda. Jews for sale p.106
Obviously the message had reminded Paul Thümmel’s warnings of March 1940 and of September 1941 and demonstrated that Hitler had not renounced.
Source: Amort C. et Jedlicka I.M. On l'appelait A.54: Un chef nazi de l'Abwehr au service de l'espionnage allié. p.169
Naturally they had been asked for evidence, which had not yet been received, but Guisan was not the sort of man prepared to be attacked without having searched every possible path to avoid such a catastrophy. Would the Swiss army take up arms against the Allies’ troops? asked WS. Guisan emphazied that he had recently given an interview to a Swedish journalist to whom he had clearly stated that Switzerland would defend its neutrality against any aggressor. He proposed to supply a copy of the article but WS explained that this would not be sufficient for Himmler: he needed a written statement by the Swiss Federal Council reaffirming Swiss neutrality to each and every belligerents.
Source: LeBor, Adam. Hitler’s secret bankers. The myth of Swiss neutrality during the holocaust. p.172
They would have been even more alarmed had they known that, on August 26 1942, Hitler had declared to Grand Admiral Raeder in a face-to-face dinner with only Bormann for witness: “A state like Switzerland, which is nothing but a pimple on the face of Europe, cannot be allowed to continue.”
Source: Bormann, Martin. Hitler’s secret conversations 1941-1944. p.537
The Germans at this stage of the war were concerned about the possibility that Allied troops coming up from Italy may try and pass through Switzerland for military operations. Guisan asks WS to stay until March 10 and WS agrees.

March 6, 1943: Guisan shows WS the document he is authorized to sign
”Whoever invades our country is self evidencing our enemy. He will be confronted by a united army of the greatest strength and a nation imbued with a single accord. At such a time there exists only one militant Switzerland inspired by one will. Because of the topography of our country we are able above all to defend our Alpine front.
Whatever may come to pass this assurance is immovable and unalterable. No doubt can arise about that either now or in the future.”
Source: LeBor, Adam. Hitler’s secret bankers. The myth of Swiss neutrality during the holocaust. p.172

March 10, 1943: WS takes General Guisan’s letter and his irrevocable commitment that the very same one had been forwarded to the Allies as well, and leaves for Berlin to start his lobbying work.
Without showing Guisan’s document, WS convince Himmler that Germany should get Switzerland to issue a strong statement on their neutrality, which would concern equally Germany and the Western Powers. Himmler agreed and WS relays Himmler’s proposal to Masson via Hans Eggen.

March 12-16, 1943: WS paid a number of visits to Roger Masson, the head of the Swiss Military intelligence. The meetings were held in the hotel Baeren, at Biglen, near Berne, and the hotel Baur au Lac in Zurich. During these meeting WS proved Masson that there was a Russian spy network operating in Switzerland. Few days later ‘Lucy passed a message to Hausamann’s buro Ha, via Xavier Schnieper, which warned that Hitler had ordered preparations for the occupation of Switzerland. The message was clear: if the Swiss were not acting, Germany would invade.’
Source: Tarrant, V. E. The Red Orchestra: The Soviet Spy Network Inside Nazi Europe (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995) p.181-182
Now we know, if there was any doubt, that WS asked for the Russian spy network

March 17, 1943: A meeting is then arranged between WS and General Guisan. WS proposes his wording to Guisan who accepts to present it to the Swiss authorities.
Source: Nara: Harrisson G. W. Final report on WS p 45

March 19, 1943: Guisan travels all the way to Berlin in order to meet again with WS, to confirm that Switzerland is prepared to issue a very strong statement concerning the western Allies as well as Germany. WS then allegedly brought the proposal to Hitler at a meeting during which WS supposedly persuaded the Fuehrer not to invade Switzerland.
Source: NARA Records of the OSS (Record Group 226) 1940-1946 Contents of RG 226: box 9 (Location 250/64/32/5-33/5) Folder entitled "In.Saint Pl.Amzon Oct," containing cables relating to counterintelligence received in the American Zone of Occupation in Germany October 1-29, 1945, 25 pp. The cable for October 10 suggests interviewing [Walter] Schellenberg about his meeting with Hitler on Switzerland.

In the Final Report on WS, history is told slightly differently: WS used the draft of the document to convince Himmler of the real determination of Switzerland to remain neutral, by military means if need be.
Himmler would then have requested Ribbentrop to reply but, the Foreign Office, apparently dismayed by Amt VI’s success, took three months to send the reply signed by Ribbentrop to the Swiss.
The German ambassador in Berne, Koecher, suggested the Swiss authority that it was WS himself who was currently underlining in Germany the risk of Switzerland joining the Allies, and that something had to be done about it. Masson felt compelled to warn WS of these rumors, which WS denied giving assurances to Masson with Himmler’s authorization.
Source: Nara: Final report on WS p 45-46
According to WS the nasty note by Ribbentrop would have been substituted by a more diplomatical one from Himmler’s office.

March 20, 1943: As requested, the “Viking Line”, the Swiss intelligence group in Germany supply Col Masson with the report of the meeting at Hitler’s headquarters in October 1942 attended by Goering, Himmler, Goebbels and Rosenberg in which the Nazi leaders had discussed the invasion of Switzerland. This was extremely alarming news, for the Viking Line information had so far proven reliable. Now the Swiss had the report with the details concerning the considered invasion of Switzerland.

March 22, 1943: The Swiss receive the information that the considered invasion is cancelled.
Source: Swiss Press: Eidgenosse – Neue Zuericher Zeitung, Volkstimme, 3/9/46, 12/27/47 (Volk und Armee) Passages of WS’s testimonies were quoted in the papers telling the story of the meetings with Masson and Guisan from his perspective. All of this found from Bauer, Yehuda. Jews for sale p.106 and p.273 note 11
Hoehne, Heinz. Krieg im Dunkeln, Bertelsmann, Munich 1985 p.415-418
Hence there are serious reasons to doubt the statements of the journalist Gisela Blau when she states “a nazi invasion was no longer a threat by December 1940.” It was a threat in September 1941, and it was a threat in March 1943. At this period Guisan Masson and WS managed to save time for Switzerland. For sure Hitler had not changed his mind. He had considered the availability of troops for the Eastern front.

So much for the ones among the Swiss, who, with conceit, do not realize what they were lucky enough to avoid being occupied, not thanks to their armed forces, but due to the sacrifices of Russian lives which created such a headache to Hitler that he had no time to focus on pressing the pimpel.

It is certainly a mistyping coincidence that (p45) Masson’s name is omitted at this part of the Final Report on WS…
Ainsi on peut se demander si la menace d'invasion n'est pas simplement une intoxication pour amener Masson a intervenir contre Rado. Dans cette hypothese, WS savait que Masson devait etre manipulé pour oeuvrer dans le sens souhaité par WS (ce qui nettoierait totalement la mémoire de Masson)
Then Lucy’s message on the invasion of Switzerland is either resulting from her being desinformed by the Germans (which would mean that both Wiking and Haussaman networks were penetrated ), or it may indicate that WS was a Russian spy linked to the Red Orchestra whose various peace feelers were the feat of an agent provocateur: possibly Werther (who was very young as well) who was transmitting from Berlin. Maybe this is why WS accused Heinrich Mueller at the end of his Memoirs to be a Soviet spy (covering his own tracks before joining the British)

Pardon d'écrire en Anglais mais le livre que je prépare est dans cette langue et la chronologie sur laquelle il s'appuye est faite dans la meme langue. Ma conclusion (sans une totale certitude) est que WS n'était pas un agent sovietique et n'était pas le centre du réseau Werther. Il était juste un nazi qui pénétrait les réseaux pour tenter de destabiliser les alliés.
Savez vous ou est enterré WS en Suisse: surement pres de Lausanne (Coco Chanel)
Comment puis je avoir copie des pages du livre du Dr Lang concernant WS?